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Background: Prospective Hazard Analysis techniques such as Healthcare Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(HFMEA) and Structured What If Technique (SWIFT) have the potential to increase safety by identifying risks before
an adverse event occurs. Published accounts of their application in healthcare have identified benefits, but the
reliability of some methods has been found to be low. The aim of this study was to examine the validity of SWIFT
and HFMEA by comparing their outputs in the process of risk assessment, and comparing the results with risks
identified by retrospective methods.
Methods: The setting was a community-based anticoagulation clinic, in which risk assessment activities had been
previously performed and were available. A SWIFT and an HFMEA workshop were conducted consecutively on the
same day by experienced experts. Participants were a mixture of pharmacists, administrative staff and software
developers. Both methods produced lists of risks scored according to the method’s procedure. Participants’ views
about the value of the workshops were elicited with a questionnaire.
Results: SWIFT identified 61 risks and HFMEA identified 72 risks. For both methods less than half the hazards were
identified by the other method. There was also little overlap between the results of the workshops and risks
identified by prior root cause analysis, staff interviews or clinical governance board discussions. Participants’
feedback indicated that the workshops were viewed as useful.
Conclusions: Although there was limited overlap, both methods raised important hazards. Scoping the problem
area had a considerable influence on the outputs. The opportunity for teams to discuss their work from a risk
perspective is valuable, but these methods cannot be relied upon in isolation to provide a comprehensive
description. Multiple methods for identifying hazards should be used and data from different sources should be
integrated to give a comprehensive view of risk in a system.
Keywords: Risk assessment, Reliability and validity, HFMEA, SWIFT, Prospective hazard analysisBackground
Prospective hazard analysis (PHA) methods are a power-
ful way to increase understanding of risks in a system
and implement changes before harm occurs [1,2]. They
have a long history in high risk systems such as transpor-
tation, nuclear power and the military [3,4]. Many PHA
methods have been developed, including Failure Modes* Correspondence: h.potts@ucl.ac.uk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orand Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard and Operability
(HAZOP), Systematic Human Error Reduction and Pre-
diction Approach (SHERPA) and Technique for Human
Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [5]. These methods share
a generally similar structure: an experienced, multi-discip-
linary analysis team is assembled; documentation about
the system is produced, including procedure manuals,
process maps or task analyses; the analysis team systemat-
ically examines the process for potential risks as guided by
the method [3]. In this study, we examined the validity of
two methods, Healthcare Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (HFMEA) and Structured What If Techniqued. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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Effects Analysis adapted for the requirements of health-
care [6] and is probably the best known prospective
method in healthcare. It requires a significant investment
in time and personnel for effective use and this may be a
factor limiting its use. SWIFT is a structured brainstorm-
ing technique that uses guide words and prompts to iden-
tify risks [7,8]. There is no specific healthcare version, but
it can be tailored by developing guide words and prompts
specific to the problem being analysed [7,8]. We applied
these methods in a community-based anticoagulation
monitoring service and investigated whether they produ-
ced similar results.
Healthcare has been slow to adopt PHA methods, [9]
notably in the UK where such methods are not man-
dated. Health care organisations rely to a large extent on
retrospective methods, including incident reporting, root
cause analysis and patient complaints, to identify risks
[10]. Retrospective methods address problems after they
have occurred, rather than preventing them prospect-
ively. Kessels-Habraken and colleagues [11] have shown
that prospective methods identify different risks than
those identified by retrospective methods, and have pro-
vided guidance on how the results of the two different
approaches can be integrated to provide a comprehen-
sive view of risks in a system. Others have also recom-
mended that PHA and retrospective methods should be
used together to provide complementary views [12].
There are several possible explanations for the slow
uptake of these methods in healthcare. First, the variety
of different methods available makes it difficult to know
which is the most suitable method for a particular risk
assessment. Lyons [9] has provided an overview of avail-
able methods to assist the novice healthcare user. Others
have also provided guidance for applying some methods
in healthcare, including FMEA [4].
Second, using these methods is resource intensive,
[13] especially if they are applied in the recommended
form. Prospective methods are collaborative and require
a multi-disciplinary analysis team to be fully effective
[2]. Many methods can take several days to apply, [9]
but less complex systems may require less complex
methods [3]. Less intensive techniques have been devel-
oped, like the Structured What-If Technique (SWIFT),
[14] that aim to achieve most of the results of other
techniques in a fraction of the time, but little is known
about their effectiveness.
Third, despite examples of the benefits of applying
these methods, [5,15,16] there is little evidence for their
reliability or validity [3,17]. Shebl and colleagues [18]
tested the reliability of FMEA by having two analysis
groups apply the technique to the same process. The
groups mapped out the process of care in a similar way,
but only a small number of risks were identified by bothgroups. Of those that were, severity ratings were differ-
ent between the two groups. Similarly, discrepancies in
HFMEA scores were found by Ashley and Armitage [19]
who found differences in severity ratings determined by
consensus between team members and those determined
by averaging team members’ individual scores.
The potential value of structured methods is the re-
duction of variability that can be achieved by guiding an-
alysts to attend to relevant information in a systematic
way. However, there is little evidence available to indi-
cate which methods might do this more effectively. Al-
though there have been some investigations of method
reliability, less is known about the validity of methods
and whether different methods produce different results.
Validation of PHA methods is methodologically challen-
ging. Ideally, safety should improve after conducting the
analysis and implementing interventions, but it would be
difficult to isolate the effect of the analysis alone on out-
come measures. A criterion measure of validity against
which to compare method outcomes would also be diffi-
cult to identify as risk analysis is a subjective process
and risks can never be fully known. The extent to which
results produced by different methods overlap, or con-
verge, could be a more useful measure of validity. Risk
and hazard analysis techniques provide a structured
process for an essentially qualitative analysis; analysts
use their judgement and experience to identify potential
events and ways to prevent them occurring. Some vari-
ability in the results obtained by different groups at dif-
ferent times in different organisations should therefore
be expected, along with some overlap. In this paper, we
investigate to what extent two prospective hazard ana-
lysis methods produce results that overlap with each
other and with prior safety measures.
Aims
The overall aim was to provide evidence of the contribu-
tion of different prospective risk analysis methods to un-
derstanding of risks in healthcare. There were three
specific aims of this study. First, we aimed to examine
the validity of HFMEA and SWIFT by comparing their
outputs in terms of the risks identified and the severity
rating of the risks identified. Because risk analysis is a
subjective process, there is no criterion against which to
assess the validity of the methods. We therefore tested
the convergent validity of the methods by investigating
the degree of agreement between the two methods in
the risks that were identified. Second, we aimed to com-
pare the results of the two prospective methods with the
results of prior safety measures, including retrospective
risk analysis methods, in order to gain an understanding
of the contribution of prospective methods for under-
standing risk. We compared results with the risks identi-
fied by a range of existing activities in a clinical service:
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and other staff, and reports of the service’s clinical gov-
ernance board. Finally, we aimed to elicit healthcare
workers’ opinions about the methods, including their
views of the benefits and limitations.
Method
Design
The study involved comparing the results from three dif-
ferent analyses of the risks present in the service. Two of
these, HFMEA and SWIFT, are prospective methods and
workshops using these methods were carried out on
matched groups of service personnel on the same day as
an experimental design. The results were compared with
those of prior safety work in the service that had been
carried out at various times. These were root cause ana-
lyses, analysis of clinical governance board meetings,
and a prior interview study.
Setting
We applied the methods in a community-based anticoa-
gulation service in which pharmacists manage patients
receiving anticoagulant medication (warfarin). The ser-
vice analysed is part of the North Central London Antic-
oagulation and Stroke Prevention Service (NCLASPS),
an established integrated care service including hospital
outpatient departments and over 30 community sites.
There are several clinical conditions for which treatment
or prevention includes giving an anticoagulant. Examples
include stroke, mechanical heart valve replacement and
venous thrombosis in the leg. The National Audit Office
estimated the annual cost of stroke alone in England is
about £2.8 billion for direct NHS care and £5.2 billion
including informal care [20]. Patients on warfarin re-
quire regular monitoring, usually achieved by attend-
ing a clinic about every 6-8 weeks, entailing a blood
test to determine the blood’s clotting behaviour, ex-
pressed through the international normalised ratio (INR).
NCLASPS is a successful service: INR control in commu-
nity patients is good with respect to external standards,
and as good as current and historical performance of the
local hospital outpatient service.
There have been (and are) various other risk assess-
ment activities in NCLASPS, including an earlier
interview study reviewing task analyses, [21] a number
of root cause analyses of critical events, and ethno-
graphic work [22]. A clinical governance board meets
regularly.
Participants
There were five participants for each prospective risk
analysis method. Different people participated in each of
the workshops, but they were matched for disciplinary
background and from the same institutions. There were2 males and 3 females in the HFMEA workshop and one
male and four females in the SWIFT workshop. In each
workshop, there were 3 pharmacists, 1 administrative as-
sistant and 1 software developer. None of the partici-
pants involved had been in a previous task analysis study
[21] and none had used PHA methods before.
The pharmacists and administrators were employed by
the lead hospital in NCLASPS. The community based
clinics are run by pharmacists and use an outreach
model. The senior pharmacists had additional roles over-
seeing and supporting junior staff, training the junior
staff and staff employed by other bodies involved in
NCLASPS, and developing the service. The administra-
tors had a patient-facing role, but generally did not at-
tend the clinics. The software team were employed by
the university and did not have a patient-facing role, but
worked closely with pharmacists and administrators to
develop and support the software used in the clinics,
namely a combined electronic patient record and deci-
sion support system [23].
Procedure
The study was approved by the Education and Manage-
ment Research Ethics Panel of King’s College London
(REP(EM)/09/10-16). All participants were fully infor-
med and consented to take part.
We ran one session for each method with the same
facilitators (PL, SD) sequentially on one day: SWIFT
first, HFMEA second. By running sessions sequentially,
we could ensure no contact between the participants in
the two groups and by having two different participant
groups, we could eliminate carryover effects. Having the
same facilitators for both sessions controlled for any
facilitator effects. However, this did mean that there was
a potential carryover effect where the facilitators’ experi-
ence in the first session affected their actions in the sec-
ond session, which would make the two methods appear
more concordant than they really are. The facilitators
were aware of the nature of the study and tried not to
let the answers in the first session affect their actions in
the second.
Both sessions were carried out in the same room with
refreshments provided. The length of the workshops was
predetermined to fit into the available time; SWIFT took
2 hours and the HFMEA took 6 hours (including half
an hour for lunch). Two of us (HP, JA) were non-partici-
pant observers, taking notes through the day. Both
sessions were audio recorded. Participants and facilitators
completed feedback questionnaires at the end of both
sessions.
In both sessions, a hierarchical task analysis diagram
(available in [21]) was used to guide the analysis. This
was developed in a previous study of the same service,
based on interview data, observations and documentary
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are not frequently used in healthcare risk assessments or
quality improvement work, they have some advantages
over the more commonly used sequential diagrams in
some situations, including for discussing work problems
with a colleague, and for developing a more detailed rep-
resentation of the work [21]. For these reasons we chose
to use hierarchical task analysis diagrams in this study.
By having both sessions use this same task analysis, we
controlled for any differences in the identification of
activity steps.
During the SWIFT workshop, a series of questions
was asked at each step of the task analysis designed to
probe what would happen if there was deviation from
normal practice. For example, step 1.1 of the task ana-
lysis is “Obtain patient list for community-based clinic”.
The facilitators posed the question “What if the patient
list was not obtained”, and followed up with additional
questions to probe the expected effect of that failure.
The output is a list of risks ranked by severity. At the
end of the session, participants were asked, as a group,
to select three of the risks identified that they considered
to be of particular importance. HFMEA is a well-
documented process [6,18] in which a team is assembled
to graphically map the process of care, examine it for
hazards, determine the severity of the hazards, the likely
causes, and recommend actions. After hazards are iden-
tified and rated, analysts decide which hazards should
proceed to analysis of causes and recommended actions.
We followed these steps with some amendments to take
into account time constraints and to incorporate the risk
matrix commonly used in UK hospitals. As described
above, we used an existing hierarchical tasks analysis
diagram to guide the analysis. Each step in the task ana-
lysis was examined for how it could fail and potential
causes of the failure. Failure modes were then rated for
likelihood and severity. Likelihood was scored on a five
point scale - rare (1), unlikely (2), possible (3), likely (4)
and almost certain (5). Severity was scored using a five
point scale ranging from none (1), minor (2), moderate
(3), major (4) to catastrophic (5). A risk matrix was then
used to obtain a risk rating of green, yellow, amber or
red. For example, a rare failure with a moderate impact
would be rated yellow, while a likely failure with a cata-
strophic impact would be rated red. Failures rated amber
or red were then examined using a decision tree to de-
termine whether further analysis of causes, actions and
outcome measures should be undertaken. If so, this is
termed proceeding with the analysis.
We also collected data about participants’ opinions of
the usefulness of the process and the outcomes. We
adapted a questionnaire used in previous studies investi-
gating participants’ experiences of using prospective risk
analysis techniques [7]. This contained 15 open-endedquestions in three areas: reactions to the workshop
process, usefulness of the outcomes, and impact on risk
awareness. The qualitative responses to the questions
were content analysed and categorised. Response fre-
quencies are reported.
Separate to the planned experiment on prospective
methods, prior work by us and the clinical team had
been ongoing to identify and ameliorate risks in the ser-
vice for both clinical and research purposes, [22,23] and
indeed continues to this day. This work, involving three
main components, was available to us. There had been a
series of root cause analyses of critical incidents. These
had been led by HP and another researcher and had in-
volved clinical (pharmacist) and administrative members
of NCLASPS. Notes from each analysis were circulated.
The study that had developed the task analysis also in-
volved additional staff interviews to identify areas of risk
[21]. Only the task analysis developed in that study was
made available to participants in this study, but these
further elements of the earlier study were considered in
our analysis of the results. The service has a clinical gov-
ernance board that meets regularly, a few times a year,
to consider a range of issues. Membership of the board
includes clinical (pharmacist, medical) and administra-
tive NCLASPS staff, clinical staff from other services,
the software team, commissioners, researchers and pa-
tient representatives. HP was a participant observer at
the board’s meeting and also carried out informal inter-
views to identify risks. Minutes from all board meetings
were available [22].
In order to analyse the degree of overlap of the re-
sults of each prospective method, a spreadsheet was
prepared listing the risks identified by the HFMEA
and SWIFT by section of the task analysis. Two re-
searchers (HP, JA) independently compared the lists
of hazards identified by the methods and decided
whether there was a match in the other list, a partial
match or no substantial match. Disagreements were
considered and consensus reached. Comparisons with
the prior safety work in the service were done on a
narrative basis alone (by HP and JA).
Results
Number of risks identified by each prospective method
SWIFT identified 61 risks, which are shown broken
down by task analysis section in Table 1, together with
the three most important risks identified.
The HFMEA identified 72 top-level risks, rated by
participants for severity and likelihood on defined scales,
and identified for each whether it would be valuable to
proceed with further analysis or not. Table 2 shows the
number of risks, the number of risks with a “proceed”
decision, and the number of severe risks with a proceed
decision, broken down by task analysis section.
Table 1 Number of risks identified by SWIFT
Task analysis section Total number of risks
identified
Number of most important risks
1.1 Obtain patient list for community-based clinic 16 1 (‘Failure or delay in referral’)
1.2 Invite patient 7 0
1.3 Schedule appointment 5 1 (‘Incomplete checklist information - judgement call, treatment
delayed, patient does not get treatment’)
2.1 Obtain recent medical history 13 0
2.2 Obtain international normalised ratio (INR) 5 1 (‘Incorrect recording of INR – cannot change INR once entered’)
2.3 Determine dose and time until next appointment 10 0
2.4 Conclude appointment 5 0
TOTAL 61 3
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Two of us (HP, JA) independently compared the two
lists and rated risks as matching or not. Our initial
judgements showed a kappa of 0.48 (moderate agree-
ment), but both raters also raised the issue of partial
matches. We thus decided to add a partial matching
category and, through further iterations of the same
process and discussion of any disagreements, reached a
consensus decision.
An example of a matching risk would be in section 2.1
(obtain recent medical history). The SWIFT identified
‘Fail to identify need for physical examination’ and the
HFMEA identified ‘Failure to consider physical examin-
ation’. In a few cases, a risk identified by one method
was divided into more than one risk by the other. For
example, in section 1.2 (invite patient), SWIFT identified
‘Patient is unaware of invite’, while the HFMEA identi-
fied two separate risks as ‘Failure for patient to receive
invite (hospital to community)’ and ‘Failure for patient
to receive invite (community invite)’. Thus, this was
marked for the SWIFT as 1 risk also identified by
HFMEA, but for the HFMEA as 2 risks also identified
by SWIFT.
Partial matches reflected some overlap between risks
identified by the two methods. For example, in section 1.2,
HFMEA identified ‘Failure to identify/be made aware ofTable 2 Number of risks identified by HFMEA
Task analysis section Total number
of risks
1.1 Obtain patient list for community-based clinic 8
1.2 Invite patient 12
1.3 Schedule appointment 13
2.1 Obtain recent medical history 14
2.2 Obtain international normalised ratio 5
2.3 Determine dose and time until next appointment 8
2.4 Conclude appointment 12
TOTAL 72special [patient] requirements (physically or mentally)’,
while SWIFT identified ‘Unaware of patient transport
needs’. Transport needs are one type of special pa-
tient requirement, so this was marked as a partial
match.
Another example, from section 2.4 (Conclude appoint-
ment), illustrates several of these points. The SWIFT
identified ‘Failure to insert or incorrect insertion of dose
and duration [in the record]’ and ‘Failure to record
reason [for dose changes]’, while the HFMEA identified
‘Incorrect documentation’, ‘Incomplete documentation’
and ‘Failure to document’. We concluded these two risks
from the SWIFT were covered by the three risks from
the HFMEA and so scored them as being matched. We
also scored ‘Incorrect documentation’ and ‘Incomplete
documentation’ as being matched by the SWIFT risks.
However, the HFMEA’s ‘Failure to document’ represen-
ted a broader risk than the SWIFT’s more specific ones,
so we scored it as being only partially matched. Mean-
while, other risks in this section identified by both
methods had no match. For example, the SWIFT identi-
fied ‘Fail to put appointment into PAS [patient adminis-
tration system]’, which had no equivalent in the HFMEA;
and the HFMEA identified ‘Failure to ensure patient
understands new dose and duration’, which had no equiva-
lent in the SWIFT.Number of risks with
proceed decision
Number of risks with proceed
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analysis. Each row gives the number of risks identified in
that section by the two methods. It then shows how
many of those risks were matched, partially matched or
not matched by the other method. As described above,
matching is not necessarily a 1:1 process. Consider the
row for section 1.2 in Table 3. As explained above, there
was 1 SWIFT risk that matched a pair of risks in the
HFMEA: thus, we see “1 also identified by HFMEA” in
the SWIFT column and “2 also identified by SWIFT” in
the HFMEA column. There were two pairs where a
SWIFT risk partially matched the HFMEA risk, but
there was also an additional HFMEA risk (‘Inability to
contact patient’) that we decided was partially covered
by SWIFT’s ‘Patient is unaware of invite’ (already rated
as fully matched). Thus, this produces “2 partially identi-
fied by HFMEA” in the SWIFT column, but “3 partially
identified by SWIFT” in the HFMEA column. There
were then additional risks identified by both methods
with little correspondence: thus, “4 not identified byTable 3 Comparison of HFMEA and SWIFT
Section Risks identified by SWIFT
1.1 Obtain patient list for
community-based clinic
16 risks identified 3 also identif
1 partially ide
12 not identi
1.2 Invite patient 7 risks identified 1 also identif
2 partially ide
4 not identifi
1.3 Schedule appointment 5 risks identified 0 also identif
1 partially ide
4 not identifi
2.1 Obtain recent medical history 13 risks identified 6 also identif
2 partially ide
5 not identifi
2.2 Obtain international normalised ratio 5 risks identified 4 also identif
1 partially ide
0 not identifi
2.3 Determine dose and time until
next appointment
10 risks identified 1 also identif
4 partially ide
5 not identifi
2.4 Conclude appointment 5 risks identified 2 also identif
0 partially ide
3 not identifi
TOTAL 61 risks identified 17 also iden
11 partially
33 not identHFMEA” in the SWIFT column and “7 not identified by
SWIFT” in the HFMEA column.
Overall, although the HFMEA and SWIFT results over-
lap in many areas, there is substantial non-matching.
For both methods, less than half the hazards were
identified by the other method. Both methods highlight
more and less serious hazards. The SWIFT picked out
three key areas to be addressed. Two of these were iden-
tified in the HFMEA, although they were not seen there
as high risk: incorrect recording of patient’s INR; and
incomplete information in medical history. The third,
failure or delay in referral (of a patient into the service),
while having no good match in the HFMEA, is a broad
concept that covered similar territory to a number of
HFMEA-identified hazards.
The HFMEA produced 12 proceed hazards with the
highest risk rating: none of these had full matches in the
SWIFT, 5 had a partial match (inaccurate patient list;
failure to give appropriate treatment between referral
into system and invitation to first appointment; failureRisks identified by HFMEA
ied by HFMEA 8 risks identified 2 also identified by SWIFT
ntified by HFMEA 1 partially identified by SWIFT
fied by HFMEA 5 not identified by SWIFT
ied by HFMEA 12 risks identified 2 also identified by SWIFT
ntified by HFMEA 3 partially identified by SWIFT
ed by HFMEA 7 not identified by SWIFT
ied by HFMEA 13 risks identified 0 also identified by SWIFT
ntified by HFMEA 1 partially identified by SWIFT
ed by HFMEA 12 not identified by SWIFT
ied by HFMEA 14 risks identified 5 also identified by SWIFT
ntified by HFMEA 4 partially identified by SWIFT
ed by HFMEA 5 not identified by SWIFT
ied by HFMEA 5 risks identified 4 also identified by SWIFT
ntified by HFMEA 0 partially identified by SWIFT
ed by HFMEA 1 not identified by SWIFT
ied by HFMEA 8 risks identified 1 also identified by SWIFT
ntified by HFMEA 4 partially identified by SWIFT
ed by HFMEA 3 not identified by SWIFT
ied by HFMEA 12 risks identified 2 also identified by SWIFT
ntified by HFMEA 1 partially identified by SWIFT
ed by HFMEA 9 not identified by SWIFT
tified by HFMEA 72 risks
identified
16 also identified by SWIFT
identified by HFMEA 14 partially identified by
SWIFT
ified by HFMEA 42 not identified by SWIFT
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failure to understand the limitations of the decision sup-
port algorithm; failure to obtain second opinion when
appropriate) and 7 had no match (incorrect updating of
computer system; potential to lose non-attenders if not
scheduled; failure to receive comprehensible information
from physical examination of patient; document incor-
rect dose; failure to ensure patient understands new dose
and duration; failure to have capability to edit incorrect
information in the record; failure to give patient correct
documentation). There are 30 further proceed hazards: 8
of these had a match in the SWIFT, 3 had a partial
match and 19 had no match.
Given two separate attempts to measure risks in the
system, under certain assumptions, we can apply a
capture-recapture methodology to estimate the total
number of risks. For the sake of computation, we count
partial matches as half matches. Thus, HFMEA finds 72
risks, including 37% (95% confidence interval: 26-49%)
of those identified by SWIFT, and SWIFT captures 61
risks, including 32% (95% confidence interval: 22-43%)
of those identified by HFMEA. This implies, using the
Chapman method, [24] a total of 190 risks may exist.
Comparison of prospective methods with prior safety work
The HFMEA and SWIFT differed substantially in terms
of hazards recognised compared to prior safety work in
the service. Root cause analyses and ethnographic work
identified communication between NCLASPS and other
healthcare services, particularly GPs, as a key problem
area, but these issues were largely absent from the
HFMEA or SWIFT results. Inter-service communication
issues also featured in the earlier interview study [21],
although other findings there fit the SWIFT/HFMEA
results better.
Patient understanding has been identified as a central
safety issue in prior work: patient understanding was
raised in discussion in the HFMEA group, but was
‘parked’ in the discussion as it did not readily fit the
structure of the process and was subsequently not in-
cluded in the final results. It was not recorded by the
SWIFT group.
Governance board observations have included consid-
erable discussion over the choice of coagulometer in the
clinic and procedures to quality assure the machines.
General health and safety issues, e.g. the suitability of the
physical space for a clinic, have also emerged. These
were largely absent in the SWIFT or HFMEA.
Other work has identified potential problems around
hygiene and sharps safety. In the context of blood sam-
ples being taken, we would normally expect hazards ana-
lysis to pay some attention to such issues, but they were
never mentioned in either the HFMEA or SWIFT. It is
also notable that no mention was made of possiblemismatches between the electronic record and the pa-
tient’s personally-held paper record.
Participants’ feedback
The acceptability of both methods was high and partici-
pants viewed the process as positive (Table 4). The meet-
ings were good-tempered, constructive and enjoyed,
with all participants contributing. Participants thought
that the hazards identified by both methods were serious
and realistic, but only HFMEA participants thought that
it identified new hazards and HFMEA participants were
more likely than SWIFT participants to state that the
workshop had increased their understanding of risk in
the service. All participants thought that the workshops
were easy to understand and that team participation in
the discussion was high. Notably, nine of the ten partici-
pants thought that the process required more time.
Feedback from the facilitators indicated that the work-
shops were interactive and participative.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate the validity of
HFMEA and SWIFT by comparing the results of these
two methods, and by comparing the workshop results
with risk data from other activities. Both prospective
methods seek to comprehensively identify the significant
risks in a service: if they achieve that goal, they should
produce similar results. This is a test of convergent val-
idity. We have no ‘gold standard’ answer as to what the
main risks in the system are, but if the results of the two
prospective methods differ substantially, we can safely
conclude that at least one of the methods is not valid.
Other safety work in the NCLASPS service – including
root cause analyses, an interview study [21] and clinical
governance board discussions – provides additional ref-
erence points.
Although there was some overlap between the two
PHA methods, each identified many unique risks not
identified by the other. The substantial number of non-
matches demonstrates, as with other research, [16,17,25]
that these prospective techniques cannot be relied upon
to be comprehensive. They find many significant haz-
ards, but do not find all potential hazards. Healthcare
services should not be complacent and presume that a
single HFMEA or SWIFT is sufficient to ensure all risks
have been identified.
The fact that the two methods produced different re-
sults may not be surprising considering the SWIFT
workshop lasted for two hours compared with six for
the HFMEA. The time difference can be partly
accounted for by the fact that HFMEA analyses risks
and identifies controls that can reduce the risk, whereas
SWIFT only analyses risks. One of our motivations for
the study was to establish whether more streamlined
Table 4 Participant opinions of the workshops
Questions HFMEA SWIFT
In your opinion did the workshop identify the most
serious hazards in the care of patients?
Yes 4 Yes 5
No 1 No 0
Did the workshop identify realistic hazards? That is,
things that realistically might go wrong?
Yes 5 Yes 5
No 0 No 0
Did the workshop identify new hazards that you
were not aware of before?
Yes 4 Yes 5
No 1 No 0
Has the workshop changed your understanding
of the risks in your work?
Yes 4 Yes 1
No 1 No 4
Was the process easy to understand? Yes 5 Yes 5
No 0 No 0
Did everyone contribute to the discussion? Yes 5 Yes 5
No 0 No 0
What were the main benefits of the workshop?
(free text; multiple answers possible)
• Identified hazards (4) • Discussion (2)
• Identified actions (1) • Increased understanding of the clinic (1)
• Increased awareness of risks (1) • Forum for reflection (1)
• Increased understanding of the clinic (1)
• Systematic (1)
What were the main limitations of the workshop?
(free text; multiple answers possible)
• Lack of time (5) • Lack of time (4)
• Session was long (1)
• Dry (1)
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more time, given time may be one of the barriers to the
use of PHA methods in healthcare [9,17]. The HFMEA
workshop identified more risks and more serious risks
than SWIFT, and this was confirmed by participant
feedback that SWIFT did not identify new hazards or
increase understanding of risks in the system. On this
basis, SWIFT would not appear to be as effective as
HFMEA for analysing clinical processes for risks. Never-
theless, SWIFT identified hazards that were not identi-
fied by HFMEA, suggesting that it could be useful in
some circumstances or used adjunctively with another
method [8].
Both methods rely on subjective judgements made by
participants and, thus, differences between the two
methods may well stem from the different participants
in our two groups. However, these methods are designed
to largely overcome such subjectivity through their
structured and systematic approach. The expectation
should be that different participants will produce largely
similar results.
Not only do the SWIFT and HFMEA show poor
concordance with each other, but they showed even
poorer concordance with a multitude of other data
sources about hazards in the service, as seen in other
work [25]. A central problem here is that of scope. BothSWIFT and HFMEA are based on a task analysis that
defines the scope of the subsequent PHA. The task ana-
lysis diagram that we used was based on those elements
of the service directly under the service’s control and did
not include processes beyond this boundary. Root cause
analyses and interviews, however, strongly indicated that
the most serious risks lie when patients cross organisa-
tional boundaries between services. There is nothing in-
herent in task analysis or PHA methods that excludes
inter-organisational work and careful scoping of the ana-
lysis at an early stage might suggest that an inter-
organisational risk analysis is the best strategy. We con-
clude it is important to bear in mind how decisions on
scope at an early stage of the work (here, the task ana-
lysis) can have effects down the line, and to consider
questions of scope carefully and flexibly. Choices over
scope should be justified with respect to other sources
of evidence (e.g. retrospective analyses). We suggest that
clinical and research teams need to act with fuzzy
boundaries: that is, one should not reject issues as being
out of the scope of the analysis – rather, these need to
be recorded and reviewed regularly to see whether the
scope needs to change.
SWIFT and HFMEA are based on task analyses or
process maps, which analyse processes as a sequential
series of acts. However, many aspects of a clinical service
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study, patient education, the suitability of the premises
and the correct functioning of the coagulometer were
omitted from the process map and from the SWIFT and
HFMEA analyses. A cognitive work analysis framework
based on functions that need to be fulfilled, rather than
task steps to be completed, may be more useful [26].
This study had several limitations. The number of par-
ticipants was small. The size of the service meant that
only two groups of 5 participants each were eligible to
take part. Different results may have been obtained if the
groups were bigger or if several workshops were con-
ducted for each method. This was not possible in the
setting in which the study was conducted, but this re-
flects the real constraints and dilemmas faced by small
clinical groups in applying these methods. Likewise,
while our facilitators were experienced, our participants
were not familiar with these methods beforehand, yet
these are the sorts of healthcare professionals that are
being encouraged to adopt PHA techniques.
The comparative design required that both workshops
take place on the same day to ensure that participants
did not discuss the workshops with each other and
therefore bias the results. This meant that we used a
briefer HFMEA procedure than is often recommended.
While this does reflect the real pressures in clinical con-
texts on professionals’ time, a longer HFMEA may have
captured more risks. The use of a more thorough
HFMEA is congruent with our recommendations and
the views of the workshop participants. We were able to
omit the step of graphically mapping the process by
using a process map that had been developed in a previ-
ous study, allowing us to save time and provide an equal
comparison with the SWIFT. However, we note that our
findings are, thus, on the process of risk assessment and
do not cover that part of the HFMEA method that in-
volves mapping the process of care (in contrast to [18])
or identifying risk control interventions.
Third, we used the same facilitators for both sessions
to control for any effects caused by facilitator experience
and style. However, this opened the possibility of a car-
ryover effect, with what the facilitators did in the second
session being influenced by what they had heard in the
first session. The facilitators were aware of the experi-
mental design and sought to counter any such effect. If
there were any carryover effect, it would decrease any
differences between the two techniques. Given that we
observed many differences between the two methods,
we argue that this has not affected the results greatly.
Conclusions
The results showed that there were many differences in
the outputs produced from these two PHA methods.
Both methods identified important hazards and werejudged as useful and positive by the participants. The
qualitative nature of the methods means that the results
could be expected to vary between methods and with
different participants. However, the collaborative discus-
sion of risks by a healthcare team is powerful and it may
be the case that raising awareness of risks in the system
through these techniques is as important a factor in in-
creasing safety as the identification of hazards. There is
a danger that the structured nature of the methods leads
practitioners to treat the outputs as highly reliable and
valid, but our results and those of others [11,18,25] show
that the results should be viewed as part of an emerging
picture of risk built from a variety of sources.
A clinical service seeking to ensure high quality should
use a range of different risk management methods and
not assume any one approach is comprehensive. It re-
mains an open question how much risk analysis is
enough, but we suggest that multiple prospective and
multiple retrospective methods should be considered
and data from different analyses integrated to provide a
comprehensive view [11]. In particular, issues of scope
need careful consideration throughout the process. We
recommend that these PHA techniques should not be
used in isolation, but should be one tool among many
within an ongoing safety strategy.
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